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Abstract
Prediction markets are used in real life to predict outcomes of interest such as presidential
elections. This paper presents a mathematical theory of artificial prediction markets for
supervised learning of conditional probability estimators. The artificial prediction market
is a novel method for fusing the prediction information of features or trained classifiers,
where the fusion result is the contract price on the possible outcomes. The market can
be trained online by updating the participants’ budgets using training examples. Inspired
by the real prediction markets, the equations that govern the market are derived from
simple and reasonable assumptions. Efficient numerical algorithms are presented for solving
these equations. The obtained artificial prediction market is shown to be a maximum
likelihood estimator. It generalizes linear aggregation, existent in boosting and random
forest, as well as logistic regression and some kernel methods. Furthermore, the market
mechanism allows the aggregation of specialized classifiers that participate only on specific
instances. Experimental comparisons show that the artificial prediction markets often
outperform random forest and implicit online learning on synthetic data and real UCI
datasets. Moreover, an extensive evaluation for pelvic and abdominal lymph node detection
in CT data shows that the prediction market improves adaboost’s detection rate from 79.6%
to 81.2% at 3 false positives/volume.
Keywords: online learning, ensemble methods, supervised learning, random forest, im-
plicit online learning.
1. Introduction
Prediction markets, also known as information markets, are forums that trade contracts that
yield payments dependent on the outcome of future events of interest. They have been used
in the US Department of Defense (Polk et al., 2003), health care (Polgreen et al., 2006),
to predict presidential elections (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004) and in large corporations to
make informed decisions (Cowgill et al., 2008). The prices of the contracts traded in these
markets are good approximations for the probability of the outcome of interest (Manski,
2006; Gjerstad and Hall, 2005). prediction markets are capable of fusing the information
c©2012 Adrian Barbu and Nathan Lay.
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that the market participants possess through the contract price. For more details, see
Arrow et al. (2008).
In this paper we introduce a mathematical theory for simulating prediction markets
numerically for the purpose of supervised learning of probability estimators. We derive
the mathematical equations that govern the market and show how can they be solved
numerically or in some cases even analytically. An important part of the prediction market is
the contract price, which will be shown to be an estimator of the class-conditional probability
given the evidence presented through a feature vector x. It is the result of the fusion of the
information possessed by the market participants.
The obtained artificial prediction market turns out to have good modeling power. It
will be shown in Section 3.1 that it generalizes linear aggregation of classifiers, the basis
of boosting (Friedman et al., 2000; Schapire, 2003) and random forest (Breiman, 2001). It
turns out that to obtain linear aggregation, each market participant purchases contracts
for the class it predicts, regardless of the market price for that contract. Furthermore, in
Sections 3.2 and 3.3 will be presented special betting functions that make the prediction
market equivalent to a logistic regression and a kernel-based classifier respectively.
We introduce a new type of classifier that is specialized in modeling certain regions
of the feature space. Such classifiers have good accuracy in their region of specialization
and are not used in predicting outcomes for observations outside this region. This means
that for each observation, a different subset of classifiers will be aggregated to obtain the
estimated probability, making the whole approach become a sort of ad-hoc aggregation.
This is contrast to the general trend in boosting where the same classifiers are aggregated
for all observations.
We give examples of generic specialized classifiers as the leaves of random trees from
a random forest. Experimental validation on thousands of synthetic datasets with Bayes
errors ranging from 0 (very easy) to 0.5 (very difficult) as well as on real UCI data show
that the prediction market using the specialized classifiers outperforms the random forest
in prediction and in estimating the true underlying probability.
Moreover, we present experimental comparisons on many UCI datasets of the artificial
prediction market with the recently introduced implicit online learning (Kulis and Bartlett,
2010) and observe that the market significantly outperforms the implicit online learning on
some of the datasets and is never outperformed by it.
2. The Artificial Prediction Market for Classification
This work simulates the Iowa electronic market (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004), which is a
real prediction market that can be found online at http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/.
2.1 The Iowa Electronic Market
The Iowa electronic market (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004) is a forum where contracts for
future outcomes of interest (e.g. presidential elections) are traded.
Contracts are sold for each of the possible outcomes of the event of interest. The
contract price fluctuates based on supply and demand. In the Iowa electronic market, a
winning contract (that predicted the correct outcome) pays $1 after the outcome is known.
Therefore, the contract price will always be between 0 and 1.
2
Artificial Prediction Markets
Our market will simulate this behavior, with contracts for all the possible outcomes,
paying 1 if that outcome is realized.
2.2 Setup of the Artificial Prediction Market
If the possible classes (outcomes) are 1, ...,K, we assume there exist contracts for each class,
whose prices form a K-dimensional vector c = (c1, ..., cK) ∈ ∆ ⊂ [0, 1]K , where ∆ is the
probability simplex ∆ = {c ∈ [0, 1]K ,∑Kk=1 ck = 1}.
Let Ω ⊂ RF be the instance or feature space containing all the available information
that can be used in making outcome predictions p(Y = k|x),x ∈ Ω.
The market consists of a number of market participants (βm, φm(x, c)),m = 1, ...,M .
A market participant is a pair (β, φ(x, c)) of a budget β and a betting function φ(x, c) :
Ω ×∆ → [0, 1]K , φ(x, c) = (φ1(x, c), ..., φK (x, c)). The budget β represents the weight or
importance of the participant in the market. The betting function tells what percentage of
its budget this participant will allocate to purchase contracts for each class, based on the
instance x ∈ Ω and the market price c. As the market price c is not known in advance,
the betting function describes what the participant plans to do for each possible price
c. The betting functions could be based on trained classifiers h(x) : Ω → ∆, h(x) =
(h1(x), ..., hK (x)),
∑K
k=1 h
k(x) = 1, but they can also be related to the feature space in
other ways. We will show that logistic regression and kernel methods can also be represented
using the artificial prediction market and specific types of betting functions. In order to
bet at most the budget β, the betting functions must satisfy
∑K
k=1 φ
k(x, c)) ≤ 1.
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Figure 1: Betting function examples: a) Constant, b) Linear, c) Aggressive, d) Logistic.
Shown are φ1(x, 1−c) (red), φ2(x, c) (blue), and the total amount bet φ1(x, 1−c)+
φ2(x, c) (black dotted). For a) through c), the classifier probability is h2(x) = 0.2.
Examples of betting functions include the following, also shown in Figure 1:
• Constant betting functions
φk(x, c) = φk(x)
for example based on trained classifiers φk(x, c) = ηhk(x), where η ∈ (0, 1] is constant.
• Linear betting functions
φk(x, c) = (1− ck)hk(x) (1)
• Aggressive betting functions
φk(x, c) = hk(x)


1 if ck ≤ hk(x)
0 if ck > h
k(x) + ǫ
hk(x)+ǫ−ck
ǫ
otherwise
(2)
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• Logistic betting functions:
φ1m(x, 1− c) = (1− c)(x+m − ln(1− c)/B),
φ2m(x, c) = c(−x−m − ln c/B)
where x+ = xI(x > 0), x− = xI(x < 0) and B =
∑
m βm.
The betting functions play a similar role to the potential functions from maximum
entropy models (Berger et al., 1996; Ratnaparkhi et al., 1996; Zhu et al., 1998), in that
they make a conversion from the feature output (or classifier output for some markets) to
a common unit of measure (energy for the maximum entropy models and money for the
market).
The contract price does not fluctuate in our setup, instead it is governed by Equation
(4). This equation guarantees that at this price, the total amount obtained from selling
contracts to the participants is equal to the total amount won by the winning contracts,
independent of the outcome.
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Figure 2: Online learning and aggregation using the artificial prediction market. Given
feature vector x, a set of market participants will establish the market equilibrium
price c, which is an estimator of P (Y = k|x). The equilibrium price is governed
by the Price Equations (4). Online training on an example (x, y) is achieved
through Budget Update (x, y, c) shown with gray arrows.
2.3 Training the Artificial Prediction Market
Training the market involves initializing all participants with the same budget β0 and pre-
senting to the market a set of training examples (xi, yi), i = 1, ..., N . For each example
(xi, yi) the participants purchase contracts for the different classes based on the market
price c (which is not known yet) and their budgets βm are updated based on the contracts
purchased and the true outcome yi. After all training examples have been presented, the
participants will have budgets that depend on how well they predicted the correct class y
for each training example x. This procedure is illustrated in Figure 2.
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Algorithm 1 Budget Update (x, y, c)
Input: Training example (x, y), price c
for m = 1 to M do
Update participant m’s budget as
βm ← βm −
K∑
k=1
βmφ
k
m(x, c) +
βm
cy
φym(x, c) (3)
end for
Algorithm 2 Prediction Market Training
Input: Training examples (xi, yi), i = 1, ..., N
Initialize all budgets βm = β0,m = 1, ...,M .
for each training example (xi, yi) do
Compute equilibrium price ci using Eq. 4
Run Budget Update (xi, yi, ci)
end for
The budget update procedure subtracts from the budget of each participant the amounts
it bets for each class, then rewards each participant based on how many contracts it pur-
chased for the correct class.
Participant m purchased βmφ
k
m(x, c) worth of contracts for class k, at price ck. Thus
the number of contracts purchased for class k is βmφ
k
m(x, c)/ck . Totally, participant m’s
budget is decreased by the amount
∑K
k=1 βmφ
k
m(x, c) invested in contracts. Since partici-
pant m bought βmφ
y
m(x, c)/cy contracts for the correct class y, he is rewarded the amount
βmφ
y
m(x, c)/cy .
2.4 The Market Price Equations
Since we are simulating a real market, we assume that the total amount of money collectively
owned by the participants is conserved after each training example is presented. Thus the
sum of all participants’ budgets
∑M
m=1 βm should always be Mβ0, the amount given at the
beginning. Since any of the outcomes is theoretically possible for each instance, we have
the following constraint:
Assumption 1 The total budget
∑M
m=1 βm must be conserved independent of the outcome
y.
This condition transforms into a set of equations that constrain the market price, which
we call the price equations. The market price c also obeys
∑K
k=1 ck = 1.
Let B(x, c) =
∑M
m=1
∑K
k=1 βmφ
k
m(x, c) be the total bet for observation x at price c. We
have
Theorem 1 Price Equations. The total budget
∑M
m=1 βm is conserved after the Budget
Update(x, y, c), independent of the outcome y, if and only if ck > 0, k = 1, ...,K and
M∑
m=1
βmφ
k
m(x, c) = ckB(x, c), ∀k = 1, ...,K (4)
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The proof is given in the Appendix.
2.5 Price Uniqueness
The price equations together with the equation
∑K
k=1 ck = 1 are enough to uniquely deter-
mine the market price c, under mild assumptions on the betting functions φk(x, c).
Observe that if ck = 0 for some k, then the contract costs 0 and pays 1, so there is
everything to win. In this case, one should have φk(x, c) > 0.
This suggests a class of betting functions φk(x, ck) depending only on the price ck
that are continuous and monotonically non-increasing in ck. If all φ
k
m(x, ck),m = 1, ...,M
are continuous and monotonically non-increasing in ck with φ
k
m(x, 0) > 0 then fk(ck) =
1
ck
∑M
m=1 βmφ
k
m(x, ck) is continuous and strictly decreasing in ck as long as fk(ck) > 0.
To obtain conditions for price uniqueness, we use the following functions
fk(ck) =
1
ck
M∑
m=1
βmφ
k
m(x, ck), k = 1, ...,K (5)
Remark 2 If all fk(ck) are continuous and strictly decreasing in ck as long as fk(ck) > 0,
then for every n > 0, n ≥ nk = fk(1) there is a unique ck = ck(n) that satisfies fk(ck) = n.
The proof is given in the Appendix.
To guarantee price uniqueness, we need at least one market participant to satisfy the
following
Assumption 2 The total bet of participant (βm, φm(x, c)) is positive inside the simplex ∆,
i.e.
K∑
j=1
φjm(x, cj) > 0, ∀c ∈ (0, 1)K ,
K∑
j=1
cj = 1. (6)
Then we have the following result, also proved in the Appendix.
Theorem 3 Assume all betting functions φkm(x, ck),m = 1, ...,M, k = 1, ...,K are contin-
uous, with φk(x, 0) > 0 and φkm(x, c)/c is strictly decreasing in c as long as φ
k
m(x, c) > 0.
If the betting function φm(x, c) of least one participant with βm > 0 satisfies Assumption 2,
then for the Budget Update(x, y, c) there is a unique price c = (c1, ..., cK) ∈ (0, 1)K ∩∆
such that the total budget
∑M
m=1 βm is conserved.
Observe that all four betting functions defined in Section 2.2 ( constant, linear, aggressive
and logistic) satisfy the conditions of Theorem 3, so there is a unique price that conserves
the budget.
2.6 Solving the Market Price Equations
In practice, a double bisection algorithm could be used to find the equilibrium price, com-
puting each ck(n) by the bisection method, and employing another bisection algorithm to
find n such that the price condition
∑K
k=1 ck(n) = 1 holds. Observe that the n satisfying∑K
k=1 ck(n) = 1 can be bounded from above by
6
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n = n
K∑
k=1
ck(n) =
K∑
k=1
ck(n)fk(ck(n)) =
K∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
βmφ
k
m(x, c) ≤
M∑
m=1
βm
because for each m,
∑K
k=1 φ
k
m(x, c) ≤ 1.
A potentially faster alternative to the double bisection method is the Mann Iteration
(Mann, 1953) described in Algorithm 3. The price equations can be viewed as fixed point
equation F (c) = c, where F (c) = 1
n
(f1(c), ..., fK (c)) with fk(c) =
∑m
m=1 βmφ
k
m(x, ck). The
Mann iteration is a fixed point algorithm, which makes weighted update steps
ct+1 = (1− 1
t
)ct +
1
t
F (ct)
The Mann iteration is guaranteed to converge for contractions or pseudo-contractions.
However, we observed experimentally that it usually converges in only a few (up to 10)
steps, making it about 100-1000 times faster than the double bisection algorithm. If, after a
small number of steps, the Mann iteration has not converged, the double bisection algorithm
is used on that instance to compute the equilibrium price. However, this happens on less
than 0.1% of the instances.
Algorithm 3 Market Price by Mann Iteration
Initialize i = 1, ck =
1
K
, k = 1, ...,K
repeat
fk =
∑
m βmφ
k
m(x, c)
n =
∑
k fk
if n 6= 0 then
fk ← fkn
rk = fk − ck
ck ← (i−1)ck+fki
end if
i← i+ 1
until
∑
k |rk| ≤ ǫ or n = 0 or i > imax
2.7 Two-class Formulation
For the two-class problem, i.e. K = 2, the budget equation can be simplified by writing
c = (1− c, c) and obtaining the two-class market price equation
(1− c)
M∑
m=1
βmφ
2
m(x, c) − c
M∑
m=1
βmφ
1
m(x, 1 − c) = 0 (7)
This can be solved numerically directly in c using the bisection method. Again, the solution
is unique if φkm(x, ck),m = 1, ...,M, k = 1, 2 are continuous, monotonically non-increasing
and obey condition (6). Moreover, the solution is guaranteed to exist if there exist m,m′
with βm > 0, βm′ > 0 and such that φ
2
m(x, 0) > 0, φ
1
m′(x, 1) > 0.
7
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3. Relation to Existing Supervised Learning Methods
There is a large degree of flexibility in choosing the betting functions φm(x, c). Different
betting functions give different ways to fuse the market participants. In what follows we
prove that by choosing specific betting functions, the artificial prediction market behaves
like a linear aggregator or logistic regressor, or that it can be used as a kernel-based classifier.
3.1 Constant Betting and Linear Aggregation
For markets with constant betting functions, φkm(x, c) = φ
k
m(x) the market price has a
simple analytic formula, proved in the Appendix.
Theorem 4 Constant Betting. If all betting function are constant φkm(x, c) = φ
k
m(x),
then the equilibrium price is
c =
∑M
m=1 βmφm(x)∑M
m=1
∑K
k=1 βmφ
k
m(x)
(8)
Furthermore, if the betting functions are based on classifiers φkm(x, c) = ηh
k
m(x) then the
equilibrium price is obtained by linear aggregation
c =
∑M
m=1 βmhm(x)∑M
m=1 βm
=
∑
m
αmhm(x) (9)
This way the artificial prediction market can model linear aggregation of classifiers.
Methods such as Adaboost (Freund and Schapire, 1996; Friedman et al., 2000; Schapire,
2003) and Random Forest (Breiman, 2001) also aggregate their constituents using linear
aggregation. However, there is more to Adaboost and Random Forest than linear aggrega-
tion, since it is very important how to construct the constituents that are aggregated.
In particular, the random forest (Breiman, 2001) can be viewed as an artificial prediction
market with constant betting (linear aggregation) where all participants are random trees
with the same budget βm = 1,m = 1, ...,M .
We also obtain an analytic form of the budget update:
βm ← βm − βm
K∑
k=1
φkm(x) + βm
φym(x)
∑M
j=1
∑K
k=1 βjφ
k
j (x)∑M
j=1 βjφ
y
j (x)
which for classifier based betting functions φkm(x, c) = ηh
k
m(x) becomes:
βm ← βm(1− η) + ηβm
hym(x)
∑M
j=1 βj∑M
j=1 βjh
y
j (x)
This is a novel online update rule for linear aggregation.
3.2 Prediction Markets for Logistic Regression
A variant of logistic regression can also be modeled using prediction markets, with the
following betting functions
φ1m(x, 1 − c) = (1− c)(x+m −
1
B
ln(1− c)),
φ2m(x, c) = c(−x−m −
1
B
ln c)
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where x+ = xI(x > 0), x− = xI(x < 0) and B =
∑
m βm. The two class equation (7)
becomes:
∑M
m=1 βmc(1− c)(xm− ln(1− c)/B+ln c/B) = 0 so ln 1−cc =
∑M
m=1 βmxm, which
gives the logistic regression model
pˆ(Y = 1|x) = c = 1
1 + exp(
∑M
m=1 βmxm)
The budget update equation βm ← βm − ηβm [(1− c)x+m + cx−m −H(c)/B] + ηβmuy(c)
is obtained, where u1(c) = x
+
m − ln(1− c)/B, u2(c) = −x−m − ln(c)/B.
Writing xβ =
∑M
m=1 βmxm, the budget update can be rearranged to
βm ← βm − ηβm
(
xm − xβ
B
)(
y − 1
1 + exp(xβ)
)
. (10)
This equation resembles the standard per-observation update equation for online logistic
regression:
βm ← βm − ηxm
(
y − 1
1 + exp(xβ)
)
, (11)
with two differences. The term xβ/B ensures the budgets always sum to B while the
factor βm makes sure that βm ≥ 0.
The update from eq. (10), like eq. (11) tries to increase |xβ|, but it does that subject to
constraints that βm ≥ 0,m = 1, ...,M and
∑M
m=1 βm = B. Observe also that multiplying β
by a constant does not change the decision line of the logistic regression.
3.3 Relation to Kernel Methods
Here we construct a market participant from each training example (xn, yn), n = 1, ...N ,
thus the number of participants M is the number N of training examples. We construct a
participant from training example (xm, ym) by defining the following betting functions in
terms of um(x) =
x
T
mx
‖xm‖‖x‖
:
φymm (x) = um(x)
+ =
{
um(x) if um(x) ≥ 0
0 else
,
φ2−ymm (x) = −um(x)− =
{
0 if um(x) ≥ 0
−um(x) else
(12)
Observe that these betting functions do not depend on the contract price c, so it is a
constant market but not one based on classifiers. The two-class price equation gives
c =
∑
m
βmφ
2
m(x)∑
m
βm(φ
1
m(x) + φ
2
m(x))
=
∑
m
βm[ymum(x)−um(x)−]∑
m
βm|um(x)|
since it can be verified that φ2m(x) = ymum(x)− um(x)− and φ1m(x) + φ2m(x) = |um(x)|.
9
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The decision rule c > 0.5 becomes
∑
m βmφ
2
m(x) >
∑
m βmφ
1
m(x) or
∑
m βm(φ
2
m(x) −
φ1m(x)) > 0. Since φ
2
m(x)−φ1m(x) = (2ym−2)um(x) = (2ym−2) x
T
mx
‖xm‖‖x‖
(since in our setup
ym ∈ {1, 2}), we obtain the SVM type of decision rule with αm = βm/‖xm‖:
h(x) = sgn(
M∑
m=1
αm(2ym − 3)xTmx)
The budget update becomes in this case:
βm ← βm − ηβm|um(x)|+ ηβmφ
y
m(x)
cy
The same reasoning carries out for um(x) = K(xm,x) with the RBF kernel K(xm,x) =
exp(−‖xm − x‖2/σ2). In Figure 3, left, is shown an example of the decision boundary of a
market trained online with an RBF kernel with σ = 0.2 on 1000 examples uniformly sampled
in the [−1, 1]2 interval. In Figure 3, right is shown the estimated probability pˆ(y = 1|x).
−1 −0.8 −0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
−1
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Figure 3: Left: 1000 training examples and learned decision boundary (right) for an RBF
kernel-based market from eq. (12) with σ = 0.1. Right: estimated probability
function.
This example shows that the artificial prediction market is an online method with enough
modeling power to represent complex decision boundaries such as those given by RBF
kernels through the betting functions of the participants. It will be shown in Theorem
5 that the constant market maximizes the likelihood, so it is not clear yet what can be
done to obtain a small number of support vectors as in the online kernel-based methods
(Bordes et al., 2005; Cauwenberghs and Poggio, 2001; Kivinen et al., 2004).
4. Prediction Markets and Maximum Likelihood
This section discusses what type of optimization is performed during the budget update
from eq. (3). Specifically, we prove that the artificial prediction markets perform maximum
likelihood learning of the parameters by a version of gradient ascent.
Consider the reparametrization γ = (γ1, ..., γM ) = (
√
β1, ...,
√
βM ). The market price
c(x) = (c1(x), ..., cK (x) is an estimate of the class probability p(y = k|x) for each instance
10
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x ∈ Ω. Thus a set of training observations (xi, yi), i = 1, ..., N , since pˆ(y = yi|xi) = cyi(xi),
the (normalized) log-likelihood function is
L(γ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ln pˆ(y = yi|xi) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
ln cyi(xi) (13)
We will again use the total amount bet B(x, c) =
∑M
m=1
∑K
k=1 βmφ
k
m(x, c) for observa-
tion x at market price c.
We will first focus on the constant market φkm(x, c) = φ
k
m(x), in which case B(x, c) =
B(x) =
∑M
m=1
∑K
k=1 βmφ
k
m(x). We introduce a batch update on all the training examples
(xi, yi), i = 1, ..., N :
βm ← βm + βm η
N
N∑
i=1
1
B(xi)
(
φyim(xi)
cyi(xi)
−
K∑
k=1
φkm(xi)
)
. (14)
Equation (14) can be viewed as presenting all observations (xi, yi) to the market simulta-
neously instead of sequentially. The following statement is proved in the Appendix
Theorem 5 ML for constant market. The update (14) for the constant market max-
imizes the likelihood (13) by gradient ascent on γ subject to the constraint
∑M
m=1 γ
2
m = 1.
The incremental update
βm ← βm + βm η
B(xi)
(
φyim(xi)
cyi(xi)
−
K∑
k=1
φkm(xi)
)
. (15)
maximizes the likelihood (13) by constrained stochastic gradient ascent.
In the general case of non-constant betting functions, the log-likelihood is
L(γ) =
N∑
i=1
log cyi(xi) =
N∑
i=1
log
M∑
m=1
γ2mφ
yi
m(xi, c(xi))−
N∑
i=1
log
K∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
γ2mφ
k
m(xi, c(xi)) (16)
If we ignore the dependence of φkm(xi, c(xi)) on γ in (16), and approximate the gradient as:
∂L(γ)
∂γj
≈
N∑
i=1
(
γjφ
yi
j (xi, c(xi))∑M
m=1 γ
2
mφ
yi
m(xi, c(xi))
− γj
∑K
k=1 φ
k
j (xi, c(xi))∑K
k=1
∑M
m=1 γ
2
mφ
k
m(xi, c(xi))
)
then the proof of Theorem 5 follows through and we obtain the following market update
βm ← βm + βm η
B(x, c)
[
φym(x, c)
cy
−
K∑
k=1
φkm(x, c)
]
, m = 1, ...,M (17)
This way we obtain only an approximate statement in the general case
Remark 6 Maximum Likelihood. The prediction market update (17) finds an approxi-
mate maximum of the likelihood (13) subject to the constraint
∑M
m=1 γ
2
m = 1 by an approx-
imate constrained stochastic gradient ascent.
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Observe that the updates from (15) and (17) differ from the update (3) by using an
adaptive step size η/B(x, c) instead of the fixed step size 1.
It is easy to check that maximizing the likelihood is equivalent to minimizing an ap-
proximation of the expected KL divergence to the true distribution
EΩ[KL (p(y|x), cy(x))] =
∫
Ω
p(x)
∫
Y
p(y|x) log p(y|x)
cy(x)
dydx
obtained using the training set as Monte Carlo samples from p(x, y).
In many cases the number of negative examples is much larger than the positive exam-
ples, and is desired to maximize a weighted log-likelihood
L(γ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
w(xi) ln cyi(xi)
This can be achieved (exactly for constant betting and approximately in general) using the
weighted update rule
βm ← βm + ηw(x) βm
B(x, c)
[
φym(x, c)
cy
−
K∑
k=1
φkm(x, c)
]
, m = 1, ...,M (18)
The parameter η and the number of training epochs can be used to control how close
the budgets β are to the ML optimum, and this way avoid overfitting the training data.
An important issue for the real prediction markets is the efficient market hypothesis,
which states that the market price fuses in an optimal way the information available to
the market participants (Fama, 1970; Basu, 1977; Malkiel, 2003). From Theorem 5 we can
draw the following conclusions for the artificial prediction market with constant betting:
1. In general, an untrained market (in which the budgets have not been updated based
on training data) will not satisfy the efficient market hypothesis.
2. The market trained with a large amount of representative training data and small η
satisfies the efficient market hypothesis.
5. Specialized Classifiers
The prediction market is capable of fusing the information available to the market partic-
ipants, which can be trained classifiers. These classifiers are usually suboptimal, due to
computational or complexity constraints, to the way they are trained, or other reasons.
In boosting, all selected classifiers are aggregated for each instance x ∈ Ω. This can
be detrimental since some classifiers could perform poorly on subregions of the instance
space Ω, degrading the performance of the boosted classifier. In many situations there exist
simple rules that hold on subsets of Ω but not on the entire Ω. Classifiers trained on such
subsets Di ⊂ Ω, would have small misclassification error on Di but unpredictable behavior
outside of Di. The artificial prediction market can aggregate such classifiers, transformed
into participants that don’t bet anything outside of their domain of expertise Di ⊂ Ω. This
way, for different instances x ∈ Ω, different subsets of participants will contribute to the
12
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resulting probability estimate. We call these specialized classifiers since they only give their
opinion through betting on observations that fall inside their domain of specialization.
Thus a specialized classifier with a domain D would have a betting function of the form:
φk(x, c) =
{
ϕk(x, c) if x ∈ D
0 else
(19)
This idea is illustrated on the following simple 2D example of a triangular region, shown
in Figure 4, with positive examples inside the triangle and negatives outside. An accurate
classifier for that region can be constructed using six market participants, one for each
half-plane determined by each side of the triangle.
_
_ _
_
_
_ _ __
_
_
_
_
_
__
+
+
+
+
Figure 4: A perfect classifier can be constructed for the triangular region above from a
market of six specialized classifiers that only bid on a half-plane determined by
one side of the triangle. Three of these specialized classifiers have 100% accuracy
while the other three have low accuracy. Nevertheless, the market is capable of
obtaining 100% overall accuracy.
Three of these classifiers correspond to the three half planes that are outside the triangle.
These participants have 100% accuracy in predicting the observations, all negatives, that
fall in their half planes and don’t bet anything outside of their half planes. The other three
classifiers are not very good, and will have smaller budgets. On an observation that lies
outside of the triangle, one or two of the high-budget classifiers will bet a large amount
on the correct prediction and will drive the output probability. When an observation falls
inside the triangle, only the small-budget classifiers will participate but will be in agreement
and still output the correct probability. Evaluating this market on 1000 positives and 1000
negatives showed that the market obtained a prediction accuracy of 100%.
There are many ways to construct specialized classifiers, depending on the problem
setup. In natural language processing for example, a specialized classifier could be based
on grammar rules, which work very well in many cases, but not always.
We propose two generic sets of specialized classifiers. The first set are the leaves of the
random trees of a random forest while the second set are the leaves of the decision trees
trained by adaboost. Each leaf f is a rule that defines a domain Df = {x ∈ Ω, f(x) = 1} of
the instances that obey that rule. The betting function of this specialized classifier is given
in eq. (19) where ϕkf (x, c) is based on the associated classifier h
k
f (x) = nfk/nf , obtaining
constant, linear and aggressive versions. Here nfk is the number of training instances of
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class k that obey rule f and nf =
∑
k nfk. By the way the random trees are trained, usually
nf = nfk for some k.
In Friedman and Popescu (2008) these rules were combined using a linear aggregation
method similar to boosting. One could also use other nodes of the random tree, not neces-
sarily the leaves, for the same purpose.
It can be verified using eq. (8) that constant specialized betting is the linear aggregation
of the participants that are currently betting. This is different than the linear aggregation
of all the classifiers.
6. Related Work
This work borrows prediction market ideas from Economics and brings them to Machine
Learning for supervised aggregation of classifiers or features in general.
Related work in Economics. Recent work in Economics (Manski, 2006; Perols et al.,
2009; Plott et al., 2003) investigates the information fusion of the prediction markets. How-
ever, none of these works aims at using the prediction markets as a tool for learning class
probability estimators in a supervised manner.
Some works (Perols et al., 2009; Plott et al., 2003) focus on parimutuel betting mech-
anisms for combining classifiers. In parimutuel betting contracts are sold for all possible
outcomes (classes) and the entire budget (minus fees) is divided between the participants
that purchased contracts for the winning outcome. Parimutuel betting has a different way
of fusing information than the Iowa prediction market.
The information based decision fusion (Perols et al., 2009) is a first version of an artifi-
cial prediction market. It aggregates classifiers through the parimutuel betting mechanism,
using a loop that updates the odds for each outcome and takes updated bets until conver-
gence. This insures a stronger information fusion than without updating the odds. Our
work is different in many ways. First our work uses the Iowa electronic market instead of
parimutuel betting with odds-updating. Using the Iowa model allowed us to obtain a closed
form equation for the market price in some important cases. It also allowed us to relate the
market to some existing learning methods. Second, our work presents a multi-class formula-
tion of the prediction markets as opposed to a two-class approach presented in (Perols et al.,
2009). Third, the analytical market price formulation allowed us to prove that the constant
market performs maximum likelihood learning. Finally, our work evaluates the prediction
market not only in terms of classification accuracy but also in the accuracy of predicting
the exact class conditional probability given the evidence.
Related work in Machine Learning. Implicit online learning (Kulis and Bartlett,
2010) presents a generic online learning method that balances between a “conservativeness”
term that discourages large changes in the model and a “correctness” term that tries to
adapt to the new observation. Instead of using a linear approximation as other online meth-
ods do, this approach solves an implicit equation for finding the new model. In this regard,
the prediction market also solves an implicit equation at each step for finding the new
model, but does not balance two criteria like the implicit online learning method. Instead
it performs maximum likelihood estimation, which is consistent and asymptotically opti-
mal. In experiments, we observed that the prediction market obtains significantly smaller
misclassification errors on many datasets compared to implicit online learning.
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Specialization can be viewed as a type of reject rule (Chow, 1970; Tortorella, 2004).
However, instead of having a reject rule for the aggregated classifier, each market participant
has his own reject rule to decide on what observations to contribute to the aggregation.
ROC-based reject rules (Tortorella, 2004) could be found for each market participant and
used for defining its domain of specialization. Moreover, the market can give an overall reject
rule on hopeless instances that fall outside the specialization domain of all participants. No
participant will bet for such an instance and this can be detected as an overall rejection of
that instance.
If the overall reject option is not desired, one could avoid having instances for which no
classifiers bet by including in the market a set of participants that are all the leaves of a
number of random trees. This way, by the design of the random trees, it is guaranteed that
each instance will fall into at least one leaf, i.e. participant, hence the instance will not be
rejected.
A simplified specialization approach is taken in delegated classifiers (Ferri et al., 2004).
A first classifier would decide on the relatively easy instances and would delegate more
difficult examples to a second classifier. This approach can be seen as a market with two
participants that are not overlapping. The specialization domain of the second participant
is defined by the first participant. The market takes a more generic approach where each
classifier decides independently on which instances to bet.
The same type of leaves of random trees (i.e. rules) were used by Friedman and Popescu
(2008) for linear aggregation. However, our work presents a more generic aggregation
method through the prediction market, with linear aggregation as a particular case, and
we view the rules as one sort of specialized classifiers that only bid in a subdomain of the
feature space.
Our earlier work (Lay and Barbu, 2010) focused only on aggregation of classifiers and
did not discuss the connection between the artificial prediction markets and logistic regres-
sion, kernel methods and maximum likelihood learning. Moreover, it did not include an
experimental comparison with implicit online learning and adaboost.
Two other prediction market mechanisms have been recently proposed in the literature.
The first one (Chen and Vaughan, 2010; Chen et al., 2011) has the participants entering
the market sequentially. Each participant is paid by an entity called the market maker
according to a predefined scoring rule. The second prediction market mechanism is the
machine learning market (Storkey, 2011; Storkey et al., 2012), dealing with all participants
simultaneously. Each market participant purchases contracts for the possible outcomes
to maximize its own utility function. The equilibrium price of the contracts is computed
by an optimization procedure. Different utility functions result in different forms of the
equilibrium price, such as the mean, median, or geometric mean of the participants’ beliefs.
7. Experimental Validation
In this section we present experimental comparisons of the performance of different artificial
prediction markets with random forest, adaboost and implicit online learning (Kulis and Bartlett,
2010).
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Four artificial prediction markets are evaluated in this section. These markets have
the same classifiers, namely the leaves of the trained random trees, but differ either in the
betting functions or in the way the budgets are trained as follows:
1. The first market has constant betting and equal budgets for all participants. We
proved in Section 3.1 that this is a random forest (Breiman, 2001).
2. The second market has constant betting based on specialized classifiers (the leaves of
the random trees), with the budgets initialized with the same values like the market
1 above, but trained using the update equation (15). Thus after training it will be
different from market 1.
3. The third market has linear betting functions (1), for which the market price can be
computed analytically only for binary classification. The market is initialized with
equal budgets and trained using eq. (17).
4. The fourth market has aggressive betting (2) with ǫ = 0.01 and the market price
computed using the Mann iteration Algorithm 3. The market is initialized with equal
budgets and trained using eq. (17). The value ǫ = 0.01 was chosen for simplicity; a
better choice would be to obtain it by cross-validation.
For each dataset, 50 random trees are trained on bootstrap samples of the training
data. These trained random trees are used to construct the random forest and the other
three markets described above. This way only the aggregation capabilities of the different
markets are compared.
The budgets in the markets 2-4 described above are trained on the same training data
using the update equation (17) which simplifies to (15) for the constant market.
A C++ implementation of these markets can be found at the following address:
http://stat.fsu.edu/~abarbu/Research/PredMarket.zip
7.1 Case Study
We first investigate the behavior of three markets on a dataset in terms of training and
test error as well as loss function. For that, we chose the satimage dataset from the UCI
repository (Blake and Merz, 1998) since it has a supplied test set. The satimage dataset
has a training set of size 4435 and a test set of size 2000.
The markets investigated are the constant market with both incremental and batch
updates, given in eq. (15) and (14) respectively, the linear and aggressive markets with
incremental updates given in (17). Observe that the η in eq. (15) is not divided by N
(the number of observations) while the η in (14) is divided by N . Thus to obtain the same
behavior the η in (15) should be the η from (14) divided by N . We used η = 100/N for the
incremental update and η = 100 for the batch update unless otherwise specified.
In Figure 5 are plotted the misclassification errors on the training and test sets and the
negative log-likelihood function vs. the number of training epochs, averaged over 10 runs.
From Figure 5 one could see that the incremental and batch updates perform similarly in
terms of the likelihood function, training and test errors. However, the incremental update
is preferred since it is requires less memory and can handle an arbitrarily large amount of
training data. The aggressive and constant markets achieve similar values of the negative
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Figure 5: Experiments on the satimage dataset for the incremental and batch market up-
dates. Left: The training error vs. number of epochs. Middle: The test error
vs. number of epochs. Right: The negative log-likelihood function vs. number
of training epochs. The learning rates are η = 100/N for the incremental update
and η = 100 for the batch update unless otherwise specified.
log likelihood and similar training errors, but the aggressive market seems to overfit more
since the test error is larger than the constant incremental (p-value< 0.05). The linear
market has worse values of the log-likelihood, training and test errors (p-value< 0.05).
7.2 Evaluation of the Probability Estimation and Classification Accuracy on
Synthetic Data
We perform a series of experiments on synthetic datasets to evaluate the market’s ability
to predict class conditional probabilities P (Y |x). The experiments are performed on 5000
binary datasets with 50 levels of Bayes error
E =
∫
min{p(x, Y = 0), p(x, Y = 1)}dx,
ranging from 0.01 to 0.5 with equal increments. For each dataset, the two classes have
equal frequency. Both p(x|Y = k), k = 0, 1 are normal distributions N (µk, σ2I), with
µ0 = 0, σ
2 = 1 and µ1 chosen in some random direction at such a distance to obtain the
desired Bayes error.
For each of the 50 Bayes error levels, 100 datasets of size 200 were generated using
the bisection method to find an appropriate µ1 in a random direction. Training of the
participant budgets is done with η = 0.1.
For each observation x, the class conditional probability can be computed analytically
using the Bayes rule
p∗(Y = 1|x) = p(x|Y = 1)p(Y = 1)
p(x, Y = 0) + p(x, Y = 1)
An estimation pˆ(y = 1|x) obtained with one of the markets is compared to the true
probability p∗(Y = 1|x) using the L2 norm
E(pˆ, p∗) =
∫
(pˆ(y = 1|x)− p∗(y = 1|x))2p(x)dx
where p(x) = p(x, Y = 0) + p(x, Y = 1).
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Figure 6: Left: Class probability estimation error vs problem difficulty for 5000 100D prob-
lems. Right: Probability estimation errors relative to random forest. The aggres-
sive and linear betting are shown with box plots.
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Figure 7: Left: Misclassification error minus Bayes error vs problem difficulty for 5000
100D problems. Right: Misclassification errors relative to random forest. The
aggressive betting is shown with box plots.
In practice, this error is approximated using a sample of size 1000. The errors of the
probability estimates obtained by the four markets are shown in Figure 6 for a 100D prob-
lem setup. Also shown on the right are the errors relative to the random forest, obtained by
dividing each error to the corresponding random forest error. As one could see, the aggres-
sive and constant betting markets obtain significantly better (p-value < 0.01) probability
estimators than the random forest, for Bayes errors up to 0.28. On the other hand, the
linear betting market obtains probability estimators significantly better (p-value < 0.01)
than the random forest for Bayes error from 0.34 to 0.5.
We also evaluated the misclassification errors of the four markets in predicting the correct
class, for the same 5000 datasets. The difference between these misclassification errors and
the Bayes error are shown in Figure 7, left. The difference between these misclassification
errors and the random forest error are shown in Figure 7, right. We see that all markets
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with trained participants predict significantly better (p-value < 0.01) than random forest
for Bayes errors up to 0.3, and behave similar to random forest for the remaining datasets.
7.3 Comparison with Random Forest on UCI Datasets
In this section we conduct an evaluation on 31 datasets from the UCI machine learning
repository (Blake and Merz, 1998). The optimal number of training epochs and η are
meta-parameters that need to be chosen appropriately for each dataset. We observed ex-
perimentally that η can take any value up to a maximum that depends on the dataset. In
these experiments we took η = 10/Ntrain. The best number of epochs was chosen by ten
fold cross-validation.
In order to compare with the results in (Breiman, 2001), the training and test sets were
randomly subsampled from the available data, with 90% for training and 10% for testing.
The exceptions are the satimage, zipcode, hill-valley and pokerdatasets with test sets
of size 2000, 2007, 606, 106 respectively. All results were averaged over 100 runs.
We present two random forest results. In the column named RFB are presented the
random forest results from (Breiman, 2001)where each tree node is split based on a random
feature. In the column named RF we present the results of our own RF implementation
with splits based on random features. The leaf nodes of the random trees from our RF
implementation are used as specialized participants for all the markets evaluated.
The CB, LB and AB columns are the performances of the constant, linear and respec-
tively aggressive markets on these datasets.
Significant mean differences (α < 0.01) from RFB are shown with +,− for when RFB
is worse respectively better. Significant paired t-tests (Demsˇar, 2006) (α < 0.01) that
compare the markets with our RF implementation are shown with •, † for when RF is worse
respectively better.
The constant, linear and aggressive markets significantly outperformed our RF imple-
mentation on 22, 19 respectively 22 datasets out of the 31 evaluated. They were not
significantly outperformed by our RF implementation on any of the 31 datasets.
Compared to the RF results from Breiman (2001) (RFB), CB, LB and AB significantly
outperformed RFB on 6,5,6 datasets respectively, and were not significantly outperformed
on any dataset.
7.4 Comparison with Implicit Online Learning on UCI Datasets
We implemented the implicit online learning (Kulis and Bartlett, 2010) algorithm for clas-
sification with linear aggregation. The objective of implicit online learning is to minimize
the loss ℓ(β) in a conservative way. The conservativeness of the update is determined by a
Bregman divergence
D(β, βt) = φ(β)− φ(βt)− 〈∇φ(βt), β − βt〉
where φ(β) are real-valued strictly convex functions. Rather than minimize the loss function
itself, the function
ft(β) = D(β, β
t) + ηtℓ(β)
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Table 1: The misclassification errors for 31 datasets from the UC Irvine Repository are
shown in percent (%).. The markets evaluated are our implementation of random
forest (RF), and markets with Constant (CB), Linear (LB) and respectively Ag-
gressive (AB) Betting. RFB contains the random forest results from (Breiman,
2001).
Data Ntrain Ntest F K RFB RF CB LB AB
breast-cancer 683 – 9 2 2.7 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4
sonar 208 – 60 2 18.0 16.6 14.1 •+ 14.2 •+ 14.1 •+
vowel 990 – 10 11 3.3 2.9 2.6 •+ 2.7 + 2.6 •+
ecoli 336 – 7 8 13.0 12.9 12.9 12.8 12.9
german 1000 – 24 2 26.2 25.5 24.9 •+ 25.1 24.9 •+
glass 214 – 9 6 21.2 23.5 22.2 • 22.4 22.2 •
image 2310 – 19 7 2.7 2.7 2.5 • 2.5 • 2.5 •
ionosphere 351 – 34 2 7.5 7.4 6.7 • 6.9 • 6.7 •
letter-recognition 20000 – 16 26 4.7 4.2 + 4.2 •+ 4.2 •+ 4.2 •+
liver-disorders 345 – 6 2 24.7 26.5 26.3 26.2 26.2
pima-diabetes 768 – 8 2 24.3 24.1 23.8 23.7 23.8
satimage 4435 2000 36 6 10.5 10.1 + 10.0 •+ 10.1 •+ 10.0 •+
vehicle 846 – 18 4 26.4 26.3 26.1 26.2 26.1
voting-records 232 – 16 2 4.6 5.3 4.2 • 4.2 • 4.2 •
zipcode 7291 2007 256 10 7.8 7.7 7.6 •+ 7.7 •+ 7.6 •+
abalone 4177 – 8 3 – 45.5 45.4 45.4 45.4
balance-scale 625 – 4 3 – 15.4 15.4 15.4 15.4
car 1728 – 6 4 – 2.8 2.0 • 2.2 • 2.0 •
connect-4 67557 – 42 3 – 19.6 19.3 • 19.4 • 19.5 •
cylinder-bands 277 – 33 2 – 22.7 20.9 • 21.1 • 20.9 •
hill-valley 606 606 100 2 – 46.9 45.8 • 46.3 • 45.8 •
isolet 1559 – 617 26 – 17.0 15.7 • 15.8 • 15.7 •
king-rook-vs-king 28056 – 6 18 – 15.6 15.4 • 15.4 • 15.4 •
king-rk-vs-k-pawn 3196 – 36 2 – 2.0 1.5 • 1.6 • 1.5 •
madelon 2000 – 500 2 – 46.1 45.2 • 45.3 • 45.2 •
magic 19020 – 10 2 – 12.0 11.9 • 11.9 • 11.9 •
musk 6598 – 166 2 – 3.7 3.5 • 3.6 • 3.5 •
poker 25010 106 10 10 – 43.2 43.1 • 43.1 • 43.1 •
SAheart 462 – 9 2 – 30.8 30.8 30.7 30.8
splice-junction 3190 – 59 3 – 18.9 17.7 • 18.2 • 17.7 •
yeast 1484 – 8 10 – 38.3 38.1 38.0 38.1
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is minimized instead. Here ηt is the learning rate. The Bregman divergence ensures that
the optimal β is not too far from βt. The algorithm for implicit online learning is as follows
β˜t+1 = argmin
β∈RM
ft(β)
βt+1 = argmin
β∈S
D(β, β˜t+1)
The first step solves the unconstrained version of the problem while the second step finds the
nearest feasible solution to the unconstrained minimizer subject to the Bregman divergence.
For our problem we use
ℓ(β) = − log(cy(β))
where cy(β) is the constant market equilibrium price for ground truth label y. We chose the
squared Euclidean distance D(β, βt) = ‖β − βt‖22 as our Bregman divergence and learning
rate ηt = 1/
√
t. To ensure that c =
∑M
m=1 hmβm = Hβ is a valid probability vector, the
feasible solution set is therefore S = {β ∈ [0, 1]M : ∑Mm=1 βm = 1}. This gives the following
update scheme
β˜t+1 = βt + ηt
1
p
(Hy)T
βt+1 = argmin
β∈S
{
‖β − β˜t+1‖22
}
where Hy =
(
hy1, h
y
2, . . . , h
y
M
)
is the vector of classifier outputs for the true label y,
q = Hyβt, r = Hy(Hy)T and p = 12
(
q +
√
q2 + 4ηtr
)
.
The results presented in Table 2 are obtained by 10 fold cross-validation. The cross-
validation errors were averaged over 10 different permutations of the data in the cross-
validation folds.
The results from CB online and implicit online are obtained in one epoch. The results
from the CB offline and implicit offline columns are obtained in an off-line fashion using an
appropriate number of epochs (up to 10) to obtain the smallest cross-validated error on a
random permutation of the data that is different from the 10 permutations used to obtain
the results.
The comparisons are done with paired t-tests and shown with ∗ and ‡ when the con-
stant betting market is significantly (α < 0.01) better or worse than the corresponding
implicit online learning. We also performed a comparison with our RF implementation,
and significant differences are shown with • and †.
Compared to RF, implicit online learning won 5-0, CB online won in 9-1 and CB offline
won 12-0.
Compared to implicit online, which performed identical with implicit offline, both CB
online and CB offline won 9-0.
7.5 Comparison with Adaboost for Lymph Node Detection
Finally, we compared the linear aggregation capability of the artificial prediction market
with adaboost for a lymph node detection problem. The system is setup as described in
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Table 2: Comparison with Implicit Online Learning and random forest using 10-fold cross-
validation.
Implicit CB Implicit CB
Dataset Ntrain Ntest F K RF Online Online Offline Offline
breast-cancer 683 – 9 2 3.1 3.1 3 3.1 3
sonar 208 – 60 2 15.1 15.2 15.3 15.1 14.6
vowel 990 – 10 11 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 2.9 •∗
ecoli 336 – 7 8 13.7 13.7 13.6 13.7 13.6
german 1000 – 24 2 23.6 23.5 23.5 23.5 23.4
glass 214 – 9 6 21.4 21.4 21.3 21.4 21
image 2310 – 19 7 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 •
ionosphere 351 – 34 2 6.4 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
letter-recognition 20000 – 16 26 3.3 3.3 3.3 •∗ 3.3 3.3
liver-disorders 345 – 6 2 26.4 26.4 26.4 26.4 26.4
pima-diabetes 768 – 8 2 23.2 23.2 23.2 23.2 23.2
satimage 4435 2000 36 6 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.7 •
vehicle 846 – 18 4 24.8 24.7 24.9 24.7 24.9
voting-records 232 – 16 2 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
zipcode 7291 2007 256 10 6.1 6.1 6.2 6.1 6.2
abalone 4177 – 8 3 45.5 45.5 45.6 † 45.5 45.5
balance-scale 625 – 4 3 17.7 17.7 17.7 17.7 17.7
car 1728 – 6 4 2.3 2.3 1.8 •∗ 2.3 1.1 •∗
connect-4 67557 – 42 3 19.9 19.9 • 19.5 •∗ 19.9 • 18.2 •∗
cylinder-bands 277 – 33 2 21.4 21.3 21.2 21.3 20.8 •
hill-valley 606 606 100 2 43.8 43.7 43.7 43.7 43.7
isolet 1559 – 617 26 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9
king-rk-vs-king 28056 – 6 18 21.6 21.6 • 19.6 •∗ 21.5 • 15.7 •∗
king-rk-vs-k-pawn 3196 – 36 2 1 1 0.7 •∗ 1 0.5 •∗
magic 19020 – 10 2 11.9 11.9 • 11.8 •∗ 11.9 • 11.7 •∗
madelon 2000 – 500 2 26.8 26.5 • 25.6 •∗ 26.4 • 21.6 •∗
musk 6598 – 166 2 1.7 1.7 • 1.6 •∗ 1.7 • 1 •∗
splice-junction-gene 3190 – 59 3 4.3 4.3 4.2 •∗ 4.3 4.1 •∗
SAheart 462 – 9 2 31.5 31.5 31.6 31.5 31.6
yeast 1484 – 8 10 37.3 37.3 37.3 37.3 37.3
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Barbu et al. (2012), namely a set of lymph node candidate positions (x, y, z) are obtained
using a trained detector. Each candidate is segmented using gradient descent optimization
and about 17000 features are extracted from the segmentation result. Using these features,
adaboost constructed 32 weak classifiers. Each weak classifier is associated with one feature,
splits the feature range into 64 bins and returns a predefined value (1 or −1), for each bin.
Thus, one can consider there are M = 32 × 64 = 2048 specialized participants, each
betting for one class (1 or −1) for any observation that falls in its domain. The participants
are given budgets βij , i = 1, .., 32, j = 1, .., 64 where i is the feature index and j is the bin
index. The participant budgets βij , j = 1, ..., 64 corresponding to the same feature i are
initialized the same value βi, namely the adaboost coefficient. For each bin, the return class
1 or −1 is the outcome for which the participant will bet its budget.
The constant betting market of the 2048 participants is initialized with these budgets
and trained with the same training examples that were used to train the adaboost classifier.
The obtained constant market probability for an observation x = (x1, ..., x32) is based
on the bin indexes b = (b1(x1), ..., b32(x32):
p(y = 1|b) =
∑32
i=1 βi,bihi(bi)∑32
i=1 βi,bi
(20)
An important issue is that the number Npos of positive examples is much smaller than
the number Nneg of negatives. Similar to adaboost, the sum of the weights of the positive
examples should be the same as the sum of weights of the negatives. To accomplish this in
the market, we use the weighted update rule Eq. (18), with wpos =
1
Npos
for each positive
example and wneg =
1
Nneg
for each negative.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0.79
0.8
0.81
0.82
0.83
0.84
0.85
0.86
0.87
Epoch
D
et
ec
tio
n 
R
at
e 
at
 3
 F
P/
Vo
l
 
 
Train Market
Train Adaboost
Test Market
Test Adaboost
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
False positives per volume
D
et
ec
tio
n 
ra
te
 
 
Train Market 7 Epochs
Train Adaboost
Test Market 7 Epochs
Test Adaboost
Figure 8: Left: Detection rate at 3 FP/vol vs. number of training epochs for a lymph node
detection problem. Right: ROC curves for adaboost and the constant betting
market with participants as the 2048 adaboost weak classifier bins. The results
are obtained with six-fold cross-validation.
The adaboost classifier and the constant market were evaluated for a lymph node detec-
tion application on a dataset containing 54 CT scans of the pelvic and abdominal region,
with a total of 569 lymph nodes, with six-fold cross-validation. The evaluation criterion
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is the same for all methods, as specified in Barbu et al. (2012). A lymph node detection
is considered correct if its center is inside a manual solid lymph node segmentation and is
incorrect if it not inside any lymph node segmentation (solid or non-solid).
In Figure 8, left, is shown the training and testing detection rate at 3 false positives per
volume (a clinically acceptable false positive rate) vs the number of training epochs. We
see the detection rate increases to about 81% for epochs 6 to 16 epochs and then gradually
decreases. In Figure 8, right, are shown the training and test ROC curves of adaboost
and the constant market trained with 7 epochs. In this case the detection rate at 3 false
positives per volume improved from 79.6% for adaboost to 81.2% for the constant market.
The p-value for this difference was 0.0276 based on paired t-test.
8. Conclusion and Future Work
This paper presents a theory for artificial prediction markets for the purpose of supervised
learning of class conditional probability estimators. The artificial prediction market is a
novel online learning algorithm that can be easily implemented for two class and multi class
applications. Linear aggregation, logistic regression as well as certain kernel methods can
be viewed as particular instances of the artificial prediction markets. Inspired from real
life, specialized classifiers that only bet on subsets of the instance space Ω were introduced.
Experimental comparisons on real and synthetic data show that the prediction market
usually outperforms random forest, adaboost and implicit online learning in prediction
accuracy.
The artificial prediction market shows the following promising features:
1. It can be updated online with minimal computational cost when a new observation
(x, y) is presented.
2. It has a simple form of the update iteration that can be easily implemented.
3. For multi-class classification it can fuse information from all types of binary or multi-
class classifiers: e.g. trained one-vs-all, many-vs-many, multi-class decision tree, etc.
4. It can obtain meaningful probability estimates when only a subset of the market
participants are involved for a particular instance x ∈ X. This feature is useful for
learning on manifolds (Belkin and Niyogi, 2004; Elgammal and Lee; Saul and Roweis,
2003), where the location on the manifold decides which market participants should
be involved. For example, in face detection, different face part classifiers (eyes, mouth,
ears, nose, hair, etc) can be involved in the market, depending on the orientation of
the head hypothesis being evaluated.
5. Because of their betting functions, the specialized market participants can decide for
which instances they bet and how much. This is another way to combine classifiers,
different from the boosting approach where all classifiers participate in estimating the
class probability for each observation.
We are currently extending the artificial prediction market framework to regression and
density estimation. These extensions involve contracts for uncountably many outcomes but
the update and the market price equations extend naturally.
24
Artificial Prediction Markets
Future work includes finding explicit bounds for the generalization error based on the
number of training examples. Another item of future work is finding other generic types
specialized participants that are not leaves of random or adaboost trees. For example, by
clustering the instances x ∈ Ω, one could find regions of the instance space Ω where simple
classifiers (e.g. logistic regression, or betting for a single class) can be used as specialized
market participants for that region.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof [of Theorem 1] From eq. (3), the total budget
∑M
m=1 βm is conserved if and only if
M∑
m=1
K∑
k=1
βmφ
k
m(x, c) =
M∑
m=1
βmφ
y
m(x, c)/cy (21)
Denoting n =
∑M
m=1
∑K
k=1 βmφ
k
m(x, c), and since the above equation must hold for all y,
we obtain that eq. (4) is a necessary condition and also ck 6= 0, k = 1, ...,K, which means
ck > 0, k = 1, ...,K. Reciprocally, if ck > 0 and eq. (4) hold for all k, dividing by ck we
obtain eq. (21).
Proof [of Remark 2] Since the total budget is conserved and is positive, there exists a
βm > 0, therefore
∑M
m=1 βmφ
k
m(x, 0) > 0, which implies limck→0 fk(ck) = ∞. From
the fact that fk(ck) is continuous and strictly decreasing, with limck→0 fk(ck) = ∞ and
limck→1 fk(ck) = 0, it implies that for every n > 0 there exists a unique ck that satisfies
fk(ck) = n.
Proof [of Theorem 3] From Remark 2 we get that for every n ≥ nk, n > 0 there is a unique
ck(n) such that fk(ck(n)) = n. Moreover, following the proof of Remark 2 we see that ck(n)
is continuous and strictly decreasing on (nk,∞), with limn→∞ ck(n) = 0.
If maxk nk > 0, take n
∗ = maxk nk. There exists k ∈ {1, ...,K} such that nk = n∗, so
ck(n
∗) = 1, therefore
∑K
j=1 cj(n
∗) ≥ 1.
If maxk nk = 0 then nk = 0, k = 1, ...,K which means φ
k
m(x, 1) = 0, k = 1, ...,K for
all m with βm > 0. Let a
k
m = min{c|φkm(x, c) = 0}. We have akm > 0 for all k since
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φkm(x, 0) > 0. Thus limn→0+ ck(n) = maxm a
k
m ≥ ak1 , where we assumed that φ1(x, c)
satisfies Assumption 2. But from Assumption 2 there exists k such that ak1 = 1. Thus
limn→0+
∑K
k=1 ck(n) ≥
∑K
k=1 a
k
1 > 1 so there exists n
∗ such that
∑K
k=1 ck(n
∗) ≥ 1.
Either way, since
∑K
k=1 ck(n) is continuous, strictly decreasing, and since
∑K
k=1 ck(n
∗) ≥
1 and limn→∞
∑K
k=1 ck(n) = 0, there exists a unique n > 0 such that
∑K
k=1 ck(n) = 1.
For this n, from Theorem 1 follows that the total budget is conserved for the price c =
(c1(n), ..., cK (n)). Uniqueness follows from the uniqueness of ck(n) and the uniqueness of
n.
Proof [of Theorem 4] The price equations (4) become:
M∑
m=1
βmφ
k
m(x) = ck
K∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
βmφ
k
m(x), ∀k = 1, ...,K.
which give the result from eq. (8).
If φkm(x) = ηh
k
m(x), using
∑K
k=1 h
k
m(x) = 1, the denominator of eq. (8) becomes
K∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
βmφ
k
m(x) = η
M∑
m=1
βm
K∑
k=1
hkm(x) = η
M∑
m=1
βm
so
ck =
η
∑M
m=1 βmh
k
m(x)
η
∑M
m=1 βm
=
∑
m
αmh
k
m(x), ∀k = 1, ...,K
Proof [of Theorem 5] For the current parameters γ = (γ1, ..., γM ) = (
√
β1, ...,
√
βm) and an
observation (xi, yi), we have the market price for label yi:
cyi(xi) =
M∑
m=1
γ2mφ
yi
m(xi)/(
M∑
m=1
K∑
k=1
γ2mφ
k
m(xi)) (22)
So the log-likelihood is
L(γ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
log cyi(xi) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
log
M∑
m=1
γ2mφ
yi
m(xi)−
1
N
N∑
i=1
log
M∑
m=1
K∑
k=1
γ2mφ
k
m(xi) (23)
We obtain the gradient components:
∂L(γ)
∂γj
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
γjφ
yi
j (xi)∑M
m=1 γ
2
mφ
yi
m(xi)
− γj
∑K
k=1 φ
k
j (xi)∑M
m=1
∑K
k=1 γ
2
mφ
k
m(xi)
)
(24)
Then from (22) we have
∑M
m=1 γ
2
mφ
yi
m(xi) = B(xi)cyi(xi). Hence (24) becomes
∂L(γ)
∂γj
=
γj
N
N∑
i=1
1
B(xi)
(
φyij (xi)
cyi(xi)
−
K∑
k=1
φkj (xi)
)
.
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Write uj =
1
N
∑N
i=1
1
B(xi)
(
φ
yi
j (xi)
cyi(xi)
−∑Kk=1 φkj (xi)
)
, then ∂L(γ)
∂γj
= γjuj. The batch update
(14) is βj ← βj + ηβjuj . By taking the square root we get the update in γ
γj ← γj
√
1 + ηuj = γj + γj(
√
1 + ηuj − 1) = γj + γj ηuj√
1 + ηuj + 1
= γ′j.
We can write the Taylor expansion:
L(γ′) = L(γ) + (γ′ − γ)T∇L(γ) + 1
2
(γ′ − γ)TH(L)(ζ)(γ′ − γ)
so
L(γ′) = L(γ) +
M∑
j=1
γjuj
ηγjuj√
1 + ηuj + 1
+ η2A(η) = L(γ) + η
M∑
j=1
γ2j u
2
j√
1 + ηuj + 1
+ η2A(η)
where |A(η)| is bounded in a neighborhood of 0.
Now assume that ∇L(γ) 6= 0, thus γjuj 6= 0 for some j. Then
∑M
j=1
γ2j u
2
j√
1+ηuj+1
> 0
hence L(γ′) > L(γ) for any η small enough.
Thus as long as ∇L(γ) 6= 0 the batch update (14) with any η sufficiently small will
increase the likelihood function.
The batch update (14) can be split into N per-observation updates of the form (15).
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